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Josh Wright’s “Chicago School Papers”: An Overview
By Wil l iam H. Page 
Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law.
In what follows, I consider three of Commissioner Wright’s “Chicago School Papers.” In these
papers, Commissioner Wright considers the past, present, and future role of the Chicago School
of antitrust analysis in the shaping of law and policy, offering along the way some interesting
insights into what his priorities at the FTC are likely to be. The papers discussed have common
themes: the mischaracterization of the “Chicago School,” the scientific advantage of dispensing
altogether with “School” labels, and a focus on empirical findings in shaping antitrust analysis. 
1. Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago School’s 
Influence on Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, no. 1, Spring 2009,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1370641 
The first paper challenges essays collected by a former FTC Chairman, Robert Pitofsky, How the
Chicago School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust.
The essays argue, in various contexts, that the Chicago School has won over the courts to a con-
servative, minimalist antitrust agenda that ignores evidence of consumer harm, and that the Post-
Chicago school literature provides a better basis for antitrust policy. Wright argues that the choice
between theories should be based on which theory has the best empirical support. On that stan-
dard, he argues, the Chicago School wins, because it “provides a more robust theoretical and
empirical account of the business practices we observe in the real world along with their compet-
itive effects.” The standard also refutes the simple characterization of the Chicago School as con-
servative in the pejorative sense of skewing inquiry away from demonstrable consumer harm.
Wright begins with a useful history of the Chicago School of industrial organization economics,
which refuted the dominant structure-conduct-performance paradigm in the 1970s,2 and the
Chicago School of antitrust analysis, initiated by Aaron Director,3 developed more fully by Richard
Posner,4 Robert Bork,5 Frank Easterbrook,6 and Benjamin Klein (and his many co-authors, includ-
ing Wright).7 These analyses have transformed antitrust by eliminating or eroding per se illegali-
ty of vertical restraints and placing merger analysis on a sounder economic footing.
He compares this body of work to Post-Chicago antitrust, which has shown that some vertical
restraints can reduce efficiency by raising rivals’ costs in certain defined circumstances.8 These
theantitrustsource   w w w . a n t i t r u s t s o u r c e . c o m   A p r i l  2 0 1 3 5
2 YALE BROZEN ET AL., CONCENTRATION, MERGERS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982); HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID ET AL., INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:
THE NEW LEARNING (1974).
3 Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future of Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (1956). 
4 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1969). 
5 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 117 (The Free Press 1993) (1978). 
6 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
7 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, 50 J.L. & ECON. 473 (2007). 
8 See, e.g., Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (2000); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C.
Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). 
results are the basis for the suggestion that the Chicago School “overshot the mark” in excusing
certain practices. Although Post-Chicago analysis has had wide influence in economics depart-
ments and in European competitive law, it has relatively little influence on American antitrust, apart
from Image Technical.9
Wright is at pains to refute the characterization of the Chicago School as a branch of conserva-
tive ideology. Instead, he insists that it is scientifically based in price theory, empirical verification,
and error cost analysis. In the heart of the paper, he offers evidence to support Chicago-inspired
reforms of recent years. For example, some Post-Chicagoans have criticized the abandonment of
the per se illegality of resale price maintenance, arguing that the need to control free riding by dis-
count retailers does not explain many if not most of the uses of the practice. Wright responds by
pointing to studies showing that, even in the absence of free riding, dealers may not provide the
optimal level of promotional services, (1) because their profit margin on promotional expenditures
is typically less than the manufacturer’s margin, and (2) because those expenditures will increase
sale of the manufacturer’s product at the expense of its rivals’ products, even when the expendi-
tures do not increase the retailers’ overall sales.10 In these circumstances, the manufacturer will
have a procompetitive reason for using RPM (or some other practice, like slotting fees) to com-
pensate dealers for providing additional (albeit unspecified) promotional services. 
Although there are anticompetitive theories of RPM, Wright suggests that the justification for a
per se rule depends on the relative frequency of the anticompetitive uses. He points to two sur-
veys of the empirical literature that conclude that RPM usually benefits consumers. In a passage
that may shed light on his approach to his new job, Wright concludes:
A scientific, Bayesian approach to the design of optimal antitrust policy requires that we update our
prior beliefs based on the available empirical evidence. In order to select the best performing eco-
nomic models from those available, antitrust decision-makers must rigorously examine the existing evi-
dence. In the context of RPM and vertical restraints, it is impossible to evaluate the existing empirical
literature without reaching the conclusion that these practices are nearly always efficient. 
In another section, Wright reviews Post-Chicago theories showing that exclusive dealing
arrangements can inefficiently exclude rivals, particularly when it is hard for dealers to coordinate
a rejection of the exclusionary proposal or when manufacturers can compensate dealers for their
participation in exclusion.11 He then reviews the literature showing efficiency justifications for
exclusive dealing, including by promoting dealer loyalty.12 Although the empirical literature is
thinner, Wright suggests that it favors the efficiency explanations rather than the Post-Chicago
“possibility theorems.” 
In a final section, he rejects the argument that the conservative ideology in Chicago School
analysis has misled the Supreme Court in cases like Brooke Group,13 Leegin,14 and California
Dental,15 to adopt unduly sweeping rules favoring legality. In response, Wright points to the vot-
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9 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
10 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988). 
11 See, e.g., Eric B. Rasmusen, Mark J. Ramseyer & John Shepard Wiley Jr., Naked Exclusion, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1137 (1991). 
12 Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2002). 
13 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
14 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
15 California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
ing record on the Court, particularly in recent years, when essentially of the Court’s decisions other
than Leegin were decided by supermajorities that included the Court’s more liberal justices. 
2. Joshua D. Wright, The Chicago School, Transaction Cost Economics and the Roberts Court’s 
Antitrust Jurisprudence, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 230 
(Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta eds., 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract_ id=1144883
In the second article under consideration here, Wright covers some of the same ground, but
focuses on the relationship between the Chicago School and both Transaction Cost Economics
(TCE) and New Institutional Economics (NIE), which takes account of transaction costs in com-
paring institutions. The Chicago School, although based on price theory, has taken account of
transaction costs, particularly in Benjamin Klein’s many studies of vertical restraints. Non-Chicago
scholars in the NIE tradition (e.g., Oliver Williamson) and TCE (Paul Joskow) have also influenced
antitrust, but Wright argues that there has been a Chicago School/TCE revolution in antitrust
reflected in Roberts Court decisions. 
The ensuing discussion of Leegin, Twombly,16 and Weyerhauser,17 has surprisingly little to say
about the role of transaction costs specifically, apart from highlighting Twombly’s reference to the
high costs of discovery in antitrust cases as one reason for tightening pleading standards. At the
end of the paper, however, Wright indicates that he finds an awareness of the role of transaction
costs implicit in the Court’s “institutional modesty”:
Each of the three decisions is motivated, at least in part, by the possibility of chilling procompetitive
conduct by erroneously assigning liability to efficient conduct. A corollary is that the Court, again in
each of the cases but especially Leegin, is sensitive to what is known and unknown about the com-
petitive effects of RPM and other contractual arrangements. The combined affinity for price theory and
TCE, emphasis on empiricism and knowledge, and institutional modesty in light of the potential for sig-
nificant error costs follow directly from Chicago School/TCE analytical principles.
3. Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust,
78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241 (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2050531
In the last paper under consideration, Wright continues his support of the substance of Chicago
School analysis, but argues for abandoning that label in favor of an approach that bypasses the
current multiplication of antitrust schools. He sets three goals for the paper: to describe the
increasingly difficult problem of “model selection” for antitrust decision making in a time when
scores of models in the economics literature compete to guide our understanding of alleged
restraints; to show how the proliferation of schools in antitrust worsens the model-selection prob-
lem; and to argue instead for a program of empirical testing to identify the most appropriate
model. 
Wright begins by defending the Chicago School against oversimplified and misleading char-
acterizations, much as he did in the first two papers. He identifies the essence of the Chicago
School in its reliance on price theory with empirical testing (what Stigler called “microeconomics
with evidence”) and its focus (following Easterbrook) on the costs of judicial error—particularly
false positives. He contrasts this approach, once again, with the multiplication of “possibility the-
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17 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007). 
orems” of anticompetitive effect of vertical restraints. He rejects the recent announcements of a
“Neo-Chicago” school18 as a repackaging of Chicago insights and methodologies with a more
accommodating rhetoric, even though the Chicago School (properly understood) has never been
doctrinaire or limited in ways that required updating. 
He also rejects proposals for a “behavioral” school of antitrust, which claims to offer a more
realistic picture of the economic motivations and conduct of producers and consumers than the
tradition economic assumption of rationality would admit. Wright suggests that the behavioral
approach is unsuited to antitrust both because of its inconsistency with the evidence and its log-
ical failings. First, the evidence does not show that firms are “predictably irrational.” Second, if
they were, it would seem to follow that everyone is irrational, including regulators, so there would
be no reason to think antitrust intervention could improve matters.
Wright then turns to the model selection problem. Among the Chicago School’s greatest
achievements was the formulation of the consumer welfare standard, which virtually all antitrust
scholars have now adopted in one form or another. Discussions of antitrust policy and briefing of
antitrust cases are guided on all sides by economics. Moreover, both the Chicago School and its
critics endorse empirical testing and updating of theories. Thus, the substance of the Chicago
School approach has gained wide acceptance on some of the most important cornerstones of a
sensible antitrust policy. The question remains, however, whether the Chicago School name (and
the prevalence of a variety of schools) has outlived its usefulness.
The adoption of the consumer welfare standard opened the door for a proliferation of demon-
strations, under various assumptions, of the possibility that virtually any restraint could reduce wel-
fare. Generalist judges now must decide which model is most appropriate for decision of the case.
This is the model selection problem. Wright argues that the association of models with schools is
an impediment to model selection in part because of the tendency of scholars to cast rival schools
in pejorative terms. For example, according to Wright, some critics (including Thomas Rosch, the
FTC Commissioner Wright has now replaced) portray the Chicago School as resistant to any
departure from the standard (and politically conservative) assumptions of price theory. These mis-
characterizations “come at the expense of serious scientific analysis of the right question and
communicate to courts and agencies abroad that the relationship between economics and
domestic antitrust policy is superficial.” Thus, he argues, the Chicago School label with a set of
policy positions and methodologies carries too much baggage to be useful. 
In place of schools, Wright suggests that all should agree on evidence-based antitrust, which
would choose theories and models based on their “predictive power” determined by the “best
available empirical evidence,” and use decision theory to pick rules that minimize social and
administrative costs of error. In a key passage, he writes:
Evidence-based antitrust policies should derive theoretical insights from the Chicago School, the
Post-Chicago School, and elsewhere—as long as such insights have empirical support. For example,
there would be no principled objection to such a program recommending a Post-Chicago School
approach to predatory pricing and a Chicago School approach to exclusive dealing—provided each
approach best fit the available evidence. Neither one size nor one school need fit all. The determina-
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18 See generally Su Sun, Antitrust Law Journal 2012 Symposium: Neo-Chicago, Antitrust Editor’s Note: Schools of Antitrust––A Parallelogram
of Forces, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 37 (2012); William H. Page, A Neo-Chicago Approach to Concerted Action, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 173 (2012); Daniel
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tive criteria would be to select the theoretical foundation with the greatest predictive power, as deter-
mined by credible and reliable empirical evidence. Such a program allows for change over time as
new evidence may lead to an updating of prior beliefs concerning either the likelihood that any given
business practice is anticompetitive or the net magnitude of social benefits and harms arising out of
a practice.
This approach favors a special role for the agencies in conducting research, taking care not to
become embroiled in policy disputes that undermine the process. As a cautionary tale, he points
the failure of the FTC’s Section 2 Hearings. Those hearings resulted in a valuable positive sum-
mary of the state of knowledge of the law and economics of monopolization, but disagreements
over the normative recommendations led the Commission to abandon the report entirely. The evi-
dence-based approach also argues for greater collaboration by the FTC with antitrust academ-
ics, and greater involvement of economists and economically sophisticated managers in the for-
mulation of commission policy.
Evidence-based antitrust also has implications for the courts. Judges should receive more eco-
nomic training in order to make the right choices among theories. The law more generally should
use the best available theory and evidence to establish appropriate filters to improve antitrust out-
comes. These include legal standards, like the monopoly power requirement for Section 2 offens-
es. They also include reliance on procedural settings like Daubert hearings19 and motions to dis-
miss under Twombly 20 for failure to state a plausible claim. Both of these settings provide an
opportunity to consider the economic validity of antitrust claims in specific cases. 
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